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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 




EDWIN J. KEARNES, 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
7387 
This appeal is taken by the defendant Edwin J. 
Kearnes from a verdict and judgment against him. The suit 
arose out of an automobile accident which occurred in the 
early morning hours of October 12, 1947. The plaintiff 
was riding in a car being operated by the defendant when 
the car overturned as it attempted to negotiate a curve on 
Holladay Boulevard at 45th South. 
A trial v1as originally had before the 1--Ionorable J. 
Pdlan Crockett and a unanimous verdict rendered by the 
jury in favor of the defendant (appellant) and against the 
plaintiff. (P'-. 93). Thereafter a new trial was granted plain..-
tiff which resulted in a divided verdict ( six..-t\NO) in favor 
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of the plaintiff, the jury assessing plaintiff's damages in 
the sum of $1859.34. (R. 106). 
Because a detailed statement of the evidence will be 
given in connection with appellant's argument, a further 
recitation of the facts at this point will serve no purpose. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
The sole question presented for review is the error of 
the trial court in granting plaintiff and respondent a new 
trial after the jury had returned a unanimous verdict of no 
cause of action. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD 
. NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
Plaintiff's motion for ·a new trial following the·verdict 
.of no cause of action was based on the following grounds: 
(R. 341). 
I 
"1. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the ver--
dict. 
2. That the verdict is against the law. 
3. Errors in law occurring at the trial and ex--
cepted to by the plaintiff. 
4. That there has been such a plain disregard by 
the jury of the instructions of the Court and 
the evidence in the case as to satisfy the Court 
that the Verdict was rendered through a mise--
apprehension of such instructions or under the 
influence of passion and prejudice." 
In granting the motion the court stated that it was not 
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basing its decision on any one ground but making its rul ... 
ing without specifying a reason so that on appeal plaintiff 
might argue any ground in support of the court's action. 
However, no argument was ever made by plaintiff that the 
trial court had committed any error which plaintiff had 
excepted to. Nor does the record show any action on the 
part of the trial court that might be claimed as error which 
was excepted to by plaintiff. 
With respect to ground No. 4, this court has here ... 
tofore determined that: 
"In order to eliminate speculations as to the basis 
of the exercise of judicial discretion in granting 
new trials, the records should show the reasons 
and make it clear the court is not invading the 
province of the jury. The trial court should indi..-
cate wherin there was a plain disregard by the jury 
of the instructions of the court or the evidence 
or what constituted bias or prejudice on the part. 
of the jury." (Saltas v. Affleck et al, 99 Utah 381, 
105 P. 2d 176.) 
Again, no reasons were given during the course of 
plaintiff's argument on motion for a new trial in support 
of the contention that there had been "such a plain dis..-
regard by the jury of the instructions of the Court and the 
evidence in the case as to satisfy the Court that the Verdict 
was rendered through a misapprehension of such instruc..-
tions or under the influence of passion and prejudice," ex..-
cept that the jury had deliberated only a matter of approxi..-
mately 15 minutes before arriving at its decision-a fact 
which itself di~ not impress the trial court nor should it be 
of any significance one way or the other. If it could, with..-
out anything more, be sufficient grounds to justify a new 
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trial that the jury did not deliberate as long as one side or 
the other felt sufficient no case would be settled by a ver ~ 
diet of a jury because the losing party in every event would 
argue that the jury had not adequately considered the is~ 
sues and the evidence or it would have reached a verdict 
favorable to such losing party. 
The ground upon v1hich plaintiff relied in his argu~ 
ment to the trial court and which appeared to influence 
the court in reaching its conclusion was that the evidence 
was insufficient to justify the verdict and such verdict was 
therefore contrary to the law. And it is to this proposition 
that appellant will direct his argument in this brief. 
In attacking the action of the lower court in granting 
plaintiff and respondent a new trial, counsel is not unmind~ 
ful of the former decisions of this court to the effect that 
"the question of granting or denying a motion for a new 
trial is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial 
court." Moser v. Zion's Co~op Mercantile Institution, 
( 1948) ______ Utah ______ , 197 P. 2d 136. See, also, White v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Ut. 56, 29 P. 1030; Van 
Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Ut. 606, 161 Pac. 50; 
Thompson v. Brown Livestock Co., 73 Utah 1, 276 P. 
651; Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 P. 2d 1155; Trim~ 
ble v. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Ut. 457, 142 P. 2d 674. 
However the trial court is not without some limitation 
in the exercise of its discretion. In the case of Saltas v. 
Affleck, supra, the court held: 
"The exercise of a judicial discretion must be based 
upon sorr1e facts notv,ithstanding great latitude is 
accorded the trial court in such matter. Klinge v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 P. 2d 357, 
105 A. L. R. 204." 
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To the same effect is the ruling of the Arizona Su ... 
preme Court in the case of Rathman v. Rumbeck, 54 Ariz. 
443, 96 P. Zd 755, where the court reversed the lower court 
in granting a new trial, stating: 
" ... the courts' discretion must be a legal and 
not a capricious one; ... it must be warranted by 
law and guided by established percedent." 
In the case of Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co., 
73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582, the court set out the criterion 
that if the lower court is of the opinion that the jury "dis..-
regarded the manifest weight of the evidence" it should 
authorize a new trial. 
Again in Valiotis v. Utah..-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah 
151, 184 Pac. 802, in determining whether the trial court 
had properly exercised its discretion in denying a motion 
for a new trial, it was held 
"This court has repeatedly held that the discretion 
of the trial court, exercised in granting or refusing 
to grant a motion for new trial, based on the in..-
sufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, 
cannot be interfered with when, upon examination 
of the evidence as disclosed by the record, it is 
apparent that there is a substantial conflict of evi..-
dence as to material issues of fact in the case rela..-
tive to which the insufficiency is alleged. In such a 
case this court must hold as a matter of law that 
no abuse of discretion is shown. (Cases supra.) 
We must of necessity, however, in every such case 
examine the record of the evidence for the purpose 
of determining whether or not there is a substan ... 
tial conflict or whether or not, as in the instant 
case, there is substantial evidence to support the 
verdict.'' 
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It was further concluded: 
"If the evidence, taken as a whole, be reasonably 
susceptible of opposite conclusions as to the exis ... 
tence or nonexistence of an ultimate fact, depend ... 
ing upon inferences to be drawn therefrom, or the 
weight to be given to the testimony of this or that 
witness, or set of witnesses, we must conclusively 
presume the fact to be such as will support the 
ruling which we are called upon to review; but if, 
atfer giving due consideration to the fact that the 
trial judge is better able to weigh conflicting evi .. 
dence, the evidence be such nevertheless as to int .. 
pel but one reasonable conclusion, and that as to 
a fact adverse to the ruling, it would be our duty 
as an appellate court to so declare, notwithstand .. 
ing there might be some conflict in the evidence." 
(Italics added.) 
In a later case, the court further defined the limits of 
the trial court's discretion by stating that the evidence must 
be substantially conflicting on "the essential matter in dis ... 
pute." Utah State Nat'l Bank v. Livingston, 69 Utah 284, 
254 Pac. 781. 
Likewise, courts in other jurisdictions have supported 
the doctrine that a trial court has· a broad discretion in the 
matter of setting the verdict aside and granting a new trial. 
But it is an abuse of discretion, stated the Florida Supreme 
Court in the case of Seaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla. 183, 183 
So. 335, to grant a new trial where the verdict as rendered 
finds ample support in the evidence and nothing can be ac ... 
complished except to have another jury review the cause. 
See, also, Burton v. Spurlock's Adm'r, 294 Ky.· 336, 171 
s. w. (2d) 1012. 
In the case of Sparks v. Long, 234 Ia. 21, 11 N. W. 
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(2d) 716, the plaintiff was struck by an automobile when 
he stepped from behind a string of automobiles while cross~ 
ing the highway intersection without apparently looking. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant and 
the trial court granted a new trial. On appeal the defend~ 
ant argued that a new trial should not have been granted 
among other reasons because the plaintiff was contributory 
negligent as a matter of law. Although the Supreme Court 
failed to agree with defendant's position in this respect, it 
did agree that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's 
motion, stating: 
Plaintiff calls our attention to the broad discre~ 
tionary powers of the trial court in granting a mo~ 
tion for new trial and cites many decisions of this 
court recognizing this rule. But the discretion which 
the trial court possesses is a legal discretion-one 
that must be exercised upon sound judicial reason--
ing. It is not unlimited. Eller v. Paul Revere Ins. Co., 
230 Iowa 1255, 300 N. W. 535. 
"Ordinarily this court will hesitate in disturbing a 
decision of the trial court in granting a motion for 
new trial when the question is one of discretion. 
But we have said this 'is a legal discretion, and 
must be predicated on the record.' Copeland v. 
Junkin, 198 Iowa 530, 199 N. W. 363, 364. We 
have examined the record in this case with care, 
and we do not find therein support for the trial 
court's ruling." (Italics added.) 
The leading case in this state where this cour has been 
called upon to review a ruling of the lower court in grant~ 
ing a new trial is Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 
Pac. 117 2. There the plaintiff filed a motion for a new 
trial upon the following grounds: 
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" ( 1) Misconduct of the jury; ( 2) surprise which 
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against; 
( 3) newly discovered evidence; ( 4) insufficiency of 
the evidence to justify the verdict; (5) that the 
verdict is against law; ( 6) errors in law occurring 
at the trial and excepted to by the plaintiff." 
As stated by the court: 
"Nothing was shown to support the first, second, or 
third grounds. As to the fifth and sixth the bill re ... 
cites that no objections were made and no excep ... 
tions taken to the charge by the plaintiff, nor to 
the court's refusal to charge as requested by him. 
It is conceded by both parties that the new trial 
was granted on the theory that the damages award ... 
ed were inadequate and not in harmony with the 
evidence." 
In determining that the original verdict should not 
have been set aside it was held: 
"On the record several theories are disclosed to sus ... 
tain the verdict rendered by the jury. In neither of 
them can it b~ said they disregarded or miscon ... 
ceived the instructions or the evidence." 
And in conclusion the court stated that before the 
trial court should interfere with the verdict of the jury 
"it should be made to appear that the jury plainly disre ... 
garded or misconceived the instructions or the evidence, 
or acted under the influence of passion or prejudice; and, 
since it is affirmatively made to appear that the new trial 
was not granted on any other ground, it necessarily fol ... 
lows no legal ground whatever existed to justify the grant ... 
ing of a new trial." {Italics added.) 
The principles enunciated in the Hirabelli Case were 
later affirmed in the case of Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 
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Utah 525, 100 P. 2d 191, although in the latter case, the 
court upheld the order granting a new trial "in the light 
of the uncontroverted evidence." 
With the foregoing principles of law before us, we 
proceed to outline the evidence which the trial court de..-
termined was insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. 
Plaintiff's right to recover is founded almost entirely 
upon his own testimony, which on direct examination (and 
without regard to matters of impeachment or contradic..-
tion established on cross..-examination) was to the effect that 
plaintiff and wife, together with defendant and others had 
spent the evening of October 11, 194 7, at the Ambassador 
Club in Salt Lake City. (R. p 167) The entire party left 
the Club approximately 1:30 a. m. on the morning of 
October 12th and rode up to the home of Mr. and Mrs. 
Jerry Johnson located on South Temple between 8th and 
9th East. (R. 168) Shortly after their arrival at the John..-· 
son home, the plaintiff borrowed a car to take his wife for 
their baby and take them home. (R. 169) After leaving 
his wife and child at home the plaintiff returned to the 
Johnsons and spent approximately fifteen to twenty min..-
utes there. (R. 171) Some of the group had left before 
the plaintiff returned to the Johnsons and a few left shortly 
after his return, so that the remaining guests consisted of 
plaintiff, defendant, Mrs. Kay Bracken, and Miss Jane 
Potts (later Mrs. N aisbitt). (R. 17 5) According to plain..-
tiff it was then quite late (approximately a. quarter to 
three) and Mrs. Bracken and Miss Potts wanted to go 
home so they asked the defendant to drive them home at 
that time. (R. 176) Mrs. Johnson offered to drive plain..-
tiff home, but he said, "Never mind, I would go with Pat 
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Kearnes." (R. 177) Thereupon the four left the Johnsons 
and went out and got in defendant's car which was parked 
in the driveway of the Johnson home betwen 8th and 9th 
East on South Temple, about three and .one .... half blocks 
from plaintiff's home. (R. 178) Mrs. Bracken sat in the 
rear seat and the others sat in front. At that time, plaintiff 
testified, the defendant asked if it would be alright to take 
the girls home first since plaintiff and defendant lived close 
together and defendant could then drop plaintiff off on the 
way home, to which plaintiff agreed. (R. 179, 180) 
From the Johnson home, the party drove east on South 
Temple, up through Military Way into Fort Douglas, and 
south through Fort Douglas to the intersection with Fifth 
South Street, where Mrs. Bracken decided that she did not 
want to go home because her husband would not be home 
at that time. She then got into the front seat and sat upon 
plaintiff's lap-it being determined that Miss Potts would 
be taken home first. (R. 181) Defendant, who was operat--
ing the automobile, then turned west on Fifth South and 
proceeded down toward the University Stadium and 13th 
East, turned left on 13th East and proceeded south to 27th 
South, then left again finally arriving at 23rd East, south 
on 23rd East to Holladay and south along Holladay Boule--
lard to 5900 South, where Miss Potts lived (R. p. 182) 
As the car started west on Fifth South, plaintiff de--
scribed the movement as fast, "he started up and started· · 
fast .... I don't know how fast, but he was pretty fast," 
at which time Mrs. Bracken made a remark about taking 
it easy, that she had a baby at home, whereupon plaintiff 
also commented that he had a little boy, too. (R. 183) 
Plaintiff further stated that defendant slowed down after 
the above remarks were made and that nothing else· was 
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\Vrong about the manner of defendant's driving until the 
car was proceeding south on 23rd East toward Holladay. 
There was a dip in the road "and vve were going fast again 
at that time, pretty fast, I don't know just how fast we were 
going; it was fast, and we took this dip, and sort of mo ... 
mentarily lost control of the car it seemed, and I noticed 
at that time Jane was nervous" so that plaintiff said to 
slow down and told Miss Potts not to be nervous. (R. 187) 
Again defendant slowed down and nothing more happened 
until after the car had reached the Potts residence. There 
plaintiff got out and allowed Miss Potts to get out of the 
car and then got back in. (R. 188) 
On the return trip defendant continued along Halla ... 
day Boulevard north from the Holladay business intersec ... 
tion. Until the- car passed the intersection it was traveling 
at a moderate rate of speed, but thereafter it continually 
picked up speed approaching the curve at 45th South, so 
that in approaching the curve the car was. "going over fifty ... 
five miles an hour." Plaintiff stated that he noticed that 
defendant made no attempt to slow down, approaching 
that curve; that he observed defendant had his foot on the 
brake and gas as the car started around the curve; that 
the car skidded around the whole curve, with the back 
wheels off the oiled surface-in fact, ''we were off it so far 
we almost hit a pole sticking out ... onto the shoulder 
there at 4500 South Street." (R. 195). The defendant lost 
a little speed so that he was going fifty miles an hour after 
completing the curve. (R. 197) Defendant was very 
alarmed and stated that "we are not in that big a hurry 
to get home, Pat, slow down." Defendant did not answer 
but "poured it on more" approaching another curve ap ... 
proximately one ... fourth of a mile away. The first curve was 
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to the left while the second curve was to the right. As soon 
as he came out of the first curve and gained control of 
the car defendant speeded up again, (R. 199) until the car 
was traveling about fifty ... five or sixty miles per hour. (R. 
200) Plaintiff further testified that in going into the second 
curve defendant did not slow down the car but put on the 
brake and the gas at the same time, "and the car swerved 
sidewards at that point on the left..-hand side of the road 
clear around the curve"; that the rear of the car narrowly 
missed some hedges on the left side of the road, then it 
went out of control and swerved over to the other side of 
the road, traveled along the shoulder, skidded sideways and 
hit a street marker, causing the car to turn over. (R. 201) 
Some distance back of both the first and second curves 
(which were not right angle curves) plaintiff testified that 
there were warning signs indicating the approach to the 
curves; (R. 204) that it had been raining earlier that eve ... 
ning; (R. 170) and that this was the first and only time in 
which plaintiff had ridden in an automobile being operated 
by defendant; ( R. 166) 
Notwithstanding the foregoing testimony given by 
plaintiff on direct examination, he admitted in the course 
of cross examination that approximately one week after the 
accident happened he had given a written statement in 
which he stated, in substance and effect, that upon his re ... 
turn to the party after taking his wife home, that he and 
defendant "decided to take the other two girls home"; (R. 
216) that plaintiff went along for the ride because he 
wanted the fresh air; (R. 217) that he further stated "we 
came down Fifth South pretty fast, and Kay remarked she 
had a baby at home, and I said the same, and, later on, at 
Holladay Boulevard, Pat went over a bump pretty fast; 
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other than that, he was driving okeh." (Italics added.) De~ 
fendant admitted that at the time of giving the written 
statement he said nothing about the car going out of con~ 
trol, or almost going out of control on Holladay Boule~ 
vard. (R. 217) 
In connection with the same statement, defendant fur~ 
ther admitted saying, "on the way back, all three of us 
were in the front seat; Pat was in a hurry and was going 
too fast for the conditions of the road; it had been raining 
and the streets were somewhat wet, and mud was on the 
shoulders; however, I don't think he was breaking any 
speed limit." (Italics added.) (R. 218) 
Plaintiff was then cross..-examined with respect to his 
testimony given in a deposition taken after suit had been 
filed, in which deposition plaintiff admitted making the 
statement that in negotiating the first curve defendant had 
been traveling about 50 miles per hour, while on direct 
examination at the trial he had just testified that they were 
going over 55 miles per hour. (R. 221) 
Again with reference to whether defendant had ap..-
plied any brakes as the car proceeded around the second 
curve, plaintiff admitted that in the deposition he had tes..-
tified: 
"Q. You say he wasn't applying his brakes, was he? 
A. He accelerated-! don't know what he was try~ 
ing to do-keep the car right I guess, he wasn't 
putting on brakes, I don't think, we were in gravel 
and it would be hard, you see, I don't think we 
slowed down any." 
Plaintiff also admitted in connection with his testi~ 
mony on said deposition that he had made no statement to 
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the effect that defendant was "stunt driving" in negotiating 
the curves, nor that he had skidded sideways around the 
first curve narrowly missing a pole. (R. 221) 
On further cross--exa1nination, plaintiff testified that 
when they arrived at the Potts' residence on 5900 I-Iolla--
day Boulevard plaintiff got out of the car to allow Miss 
Potts to get out and then got back in the car without say--
ing anything to the defendant about the manner of his 
driving; that the first time anything was said to the de--
fendant about his driving after that was after they had pro--
ceeded around the first curve when a statement was made 
to the effect that defendant should take it easy; that he had 
just made the remark take it easy and stated he had been 
in eight accidents before when the car started to round the 
second curve and left the highway. (R. 222, 223) 
From the foregoing admissions made by the plaintiff 
in the course of cross--examination it was clearly established 
that his story had changed at least once and in some par--
ticulars twice since the accident happened. At first plain--
tiff had given the statement that he did not think defendant 
exceeded any speed limit. Later, in his deposition he stated 
at one po~nt defendant was ~xceeding the speed limit. But 
on direct examination at the trial he testified the defendant 
was exceeding the speed limit several times. 
Nor was plaintiff's testimony corroborated by any of 
the other witnesses with the exception of the incident which 
occurred on Twenty--Third East when the car went over a 
"bump" instead of a "dip." Both of the lady passengers 
were called as witnesses in the case. Mrs. Jane N aisbi tt 
(formerly Jane Potts) testified that she was friendly to 
both parties in the action, (R. 256) and that at the time 
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in question she and Mrs. Bracken were riding in the auto ... 
mobile \vith plaintiff and defendant. She stated that as the 
car went over a bump on Twenty ... Third East, she became 
uneasy and pushed her feet on the floor board whereupon 
the plaintiff said "Janey, don't worry; Pat is a good driver," 
and then said "slow down Pat"; that she had observed 
nothing irregular about defendant's driving prior to that 
time and did not even observe whether he slowed up after 
the comment was made by the plaintiff; and did not know 
whether de~endant even heard the remark; that she was 
not nervous or upset at any other point and was only mo ... 
mentarily upset at that time because she was aware of the 
bump in the road. (R. 262, 263) She also testified that the 
car did not go out of control but continued on down the 
road. (R. 264) However, as the car went over the bump 
she turned to look at the speedometer and it appeared to 
read 80 miles per hour, but because she was looking at the 
speedometer at an angle she could not state whether it was 
actually reading 80 miles per hour or not; that although 
she had driven an automobile for some time, she had no 
independent opinion with respect to the speed of the car 
and could not state that the car was traveling at 80 miles 
per hour when she observed the speedometer; that the only 
thing that gave her any indication that the car was travel ... 
ing fast was the way it went over the bump. (R. 264 ... 266) 
The other occupant of the car, Mrs. Bracken, testified 
that she had ridden in the rear seat until the car reached 
Fifth South and Fort Douglas, at which point she decided 
to drive out to the home of Betty Toigo (one of the girls 
who had been at the party) to see if her husband had taken 
Miss Toigo home, at which time she went up in the front 
seat and sat between the plaintiff and Mrs. Naisbitt. (R. 
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281) She further testified that at no time did she observe 
any irregularity in the manner in which the car was being 
operated either on the way out to 5900 Holladay Boulevard 
or on the return until just at the time the automobile com ... 
menced to skid in proceeding around the second curve. (R. 
281.-284) Neither Mrs. Bracken nor Mrs. Naisbitt testi.-
fied to any irregularity in the driving as the car came down 
Fifth South from Fort Douglas toward Thirteenth East. 
Officer Van Leuween who assisted in the investigation 
of the accident testified that he and his companion had 
measured that from where the car left the highway in pro.-
ceeding around the second curve it traveled 60 feet north 
along the west side of the highway, and then crossed the 
road to the east side of the highway a distance of 30 feet 
and traveled approximately 84 feet along the east side "be.-
fore he was laid on his side." (R. 249) That in the dis.-
tance the car traveled 84 feet along the right side of the 
highway the car was off the shoulder and one wheel was in 
the ditch. (R. 255) 
It ·is upon the foregoing ~estimony that the plaintiff 
relies for recovery in the instant matter. Of course, the 
statement made by the defendant more nearly coincides 
with the testimony of Mrs. Bracken and Mrs. ~~aisbitt ex.-
cept that defendant testified he did not notice any bump 
as the car proceeded south on Twenty.-Third East approach.-
ing Holladay Boulevard. (R. 295) Defendant testified that 
on the evening in question he had offered to take the girls 
home and the plaintiff had asked to go along for the ride; 
(R. 291) that after getting in the automobile he proceeded 
to Betty Toigo's residence near Twenty.-Seventh South and 
Twentieth East where they stopped for a few minutes to 
see if Miss Toigo had arrived home. Upon leaving there 
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the autotnobile proceeded on to T-vventy..-Third East, south 
to Holladay Boulevard, and then along Holladay Boulevard 
to 5900 where Mrs. Naisbitt was let off; that at no time did 
defendant drive in excess of forty ... five miles per hour. (R. 
296) Upon the return trip there -vvas nothing irregular in 
the manner in which the automobile negotiated the first 
curve, but that in approaching the second curve defendant 
\vas confused because of the shrubbery and weeds along the 
right side of the highway and the street lights on the left, 
which proceeded straight vvest along Forty..-Fifth South 
Street, so that he was into the curve before he realized it. 
(R. 297, 298) As soon as he observed the curve he pro..-
ceeded to turn but the wheels ''seemed to slide or something 
-the rear ~heels went into the mud on the soft shoulders, 
and I brought the car out of that turn, then vve cut across 
the road to the right; I swung the wheel to the left, and 
the car went down straight, then into a ditch and hit some 
obstruction in the ditch, swung sideways to the left, and 
rolled over." (R. 298) 
In the light of the foregoing evidence it does not seem 
possible that the trial court had any discretion to grant the 
plaintiff a new trial. The jury had the opportunity of con..-
sidering all of the evidence; and, under the instructions of 
the court, had the right to judge the credibility of the wit..-
nesses. In the latter connection the court instructed the 
jury that "you have the right to take into consideration 
their [witnesses] deportment upon the witness stand, their 
interest in the result of the suit, the reasonableness of their 
statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want 
of it, their opportunities to know or understand, and their 
capacity to remmeber." (R. 85). The jury having deter..-
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mined the issues in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiff, such verdict should have been sustained. 
Indeed, it would appear that the language of the court 
in the case of Acosta v. Craik, 288 N. Y. S. 868, 248 App. 
Div. 209, is entirely appropriate to the facts in this case. 
There the court said: 
"The conflicting claim of the plaintiff's and the de~ 
fendant's witnesses presented purely issues of fact 
which were properly submitted to the jury in a 
clear, comprehensive charge that adequately pro~ 
tected plaintiff's rights, to which no exceptions 
whatever were taken by either_ side. No errors are 
claimed in the admission or rejection of evidence 
or in the charge. The jury, after deliberation, re~ 
turned a verdict in favor of defendant, and the evi~ 
dence adduced, which the jury evidently accepted 
as true, supports the jury's verdict. Accordingly, 
it was error on the part of the trial court to set 
aside the verdict and direct a new trial.'' 
In view of the limitations prescribed by the cases here~ 
tofore cited on the power of the trial court to grant a new 
trial, it would appear that there was an abuse of such dis-
cretion in the instant case. In the case of Sharpensteen v. 
Sanguinetti, 33 Ariz. 110, 262 Pac. 609, the court in con~ 
sidering the limitations on the discretion of the trial court 
to grant a new trial held: 
"It is of course the law that granting of a new trial 
is largely in the discretion of the trial court, and 
that the reviewing court will not disturb the rul.-
ing except for an abuse of that discretion. What 
is meant by discretion in that connection is a legal 
discretion, one based upon reason and law. If the 
showing for a new trial is insufficient both in form 
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and substance, as the one here appears to be, it 
may be said that there is no discretion to be exer ... 
cised. The rule that should guide the trial judge 
in passing upon a motion for new trial is very well 
stated in Sovereign Camp, etc., v. Thiebaud, 65 
Kan. 332, 69 P. 348, as follows: 
" 'The discretion of district courts in the matter of 
granting or refusing new trials is ·a legal, not a 
capricious, one. It must be warranted by law, and 
guided by established precedent. It may not be 
exercised simply because the judge might wish the 
verdict to be othervvise. The test and warrant for 
its use is, Has the applicant therefor shown a 
legal reason for its existence?' " 
In the instant case there was no reason in law or in 
fact for granting the plaintiff a new trial except that the 
court might have desired the verdict to be other than that 
which was rendered. 
However, appellant also urges that the trial court 
erred in granting plaintiff and respondent a new trial for 
the reason that under the evidence there was only one ver..-
dict which the jury could reasonably have rendered, and 
that was a verdict of no cause of action. One of appellant's 
requested instructions was that the court instruct the jury 
to return a verdict of no cause of action, which instruction 
the court refused to give. It has been held that at all events 
a new trial should not be granted where it appears from the 
record that the party making the motion did not make a 
case and there is no reasonable probability that on a new 
trial he can make a case. See Schnell v. Northern Pacific 
Railroad Co., 71 N. D. 369, 1 N. W. (2d) 56, where the 
court held: 
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"Whether a new trial should be granted rests largely 
in the sound discretion of the trial court, and an 
order granting a motion therefor will not be dis--
turbed unless it can be said that there was an abuse 
of that discretion. Martin v. Parkins, 55 N. D. 
339, 213 N. W. 764; State v.·McEnroe, 68 N.D. 
615, 283 N. W. 57; and authorities cited in the 
foregoing cases. But this discretion is a legal dis--
cretion to be exercised in the interest of justice, so 
if it appears on the record that the party making 
the motion has not made a case and there is no 
reasonable probability that on a new trial he can 
make a case, an order granting a new trial will not 
be sustained. Kohlman v. Hyland, 56 N. D. 772, 
219 N. W. 228, and authorities cited therein." 
In the case of Halsan v. Johnson, 155 Ore. 583, 65 
Pac. (2d) 661, the Supreme Court reversed an order grant--
ing a new trial stating: 
"\Ve have carefully read all the testimony in the 
case and have given thorough consideration to the 
alleged errors assigned in the motion for a new 
trial. Without discussing each one of such alleged 
errors, it is sufficient to say that it is our con-
clusion that the jury arrived at the one and only 
result that could be sustained by the facts in the 
case. The record does not contain sufficient evi--
dence from which the jury could have found or 
inferred that the defendant was guilty of any of 
the acts of negligence charged against her in the 
complaint. It was incumbent upon plaintiff to 
prove that defendant was ·negligent, not upon the 
latter to prove that she was free from negligence." 
In the case of Walters v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 320 
Pa. 588, 184 Atl. 25, it was held: 
"It is true we do not as a general thing reverse where 
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a new trial is granted, but \vhere it is clear, as a 
matter of lavv, that the verdict rendered was cor..-
rect on the proofs submitted, then we do, and 
ought to reverse, because the court, in awarding 
the new trial, has committed an error of law." 
In the instant case plaintiff and respondent relied upon 
three alleged grounds of willful misconduct: (R. 65) 
1. That defendant drove the automobile at an exces..-
sive rate of speed under the circumstances. 
2. That he failed to keep the car under control. 
3. That he failed to keep a proper lookout. 
The evidence in support of the foregoing allegations 
did not as a matter of law establish willful misconduct as 
alleged. Willful misconduct was defined by the court in 
Instruction No. 7 as follows: (R. 71) 
"You are instructed that willful misconduct is the 
intentional doing of an act or intentioally omitting 
or failing to do an act, with knowledge that serious 
injury is a probable and not merely possible re..-
sult, or the intentional doing of an act with wanton 
and reckless disregard of the possible consequences. 
It involves deliberate intentional or wanton con..-
duct in doing or omitting to do an act with knowl..-
edge or appreciation that injury is likely to result 
therefrom.'' 
The court further stated in Instruction No. 6 that 
willful misconduct connotes a greater wrong doing than 
mere negligence or even gross negligence. "It includes a 
conscious or intentional violation of definite law or rule of 
conduct, with the knowledge of the peril to be apprehended 
from such act or failure to act." This instruction clearly 
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states the law with reference to what constitutes willful 
misconduct as defined by the courts of various jurisdic--
tions. For instance, in the case of Howard v. Howard, 132 
Cal. App. 124, 22 Pac. (2d) 279, the court held: 
"Willful misconduct implies at least the intentional 
doing of something either with a knowledge that 
serious injury is a probable (as distinguished from 
a possible) result, or the intentional doing of an 
act with a wanton and reckless disregard of its 
possible result." 
The court further quoted with approval the following 
language of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the 
case of In re Burns, 218 Mass. 8, 105 N. E. 601: 
"To constitute 'willful misconduct' there must be 
actual knowledge, or that which in the law is es--
teemed to be the equivalent of actual knowledge, 
of the peril to be apprehended from the failure 
·to act, coupled with a conscious failure to act to 
the end of averting injury." 
In the light of the foregoing rules, the evidence in this 
case was not sufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff 
had one been returned by the jury. The only evidence of 
excessive speed was that given by the plaintiff himself, who 
admitted that immediately following the accident he had 
given a written statement in which he said that he did not 
believe the defendant was exceeding any speed limit. Again 
on his deposition prior to the trial the testimony was that 
defendant was traveling· at approximately 50 miles per 
hour. It was stipulated at the trial that the posted speed 
limit for night time driving at and near the place where 
the accident occurred .was 50 miles per hour at this time. 
(R. 334) There was no evidence that due to the condi.-
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speed limit \vas required. Therefore, defendant was en ... 
titled to assume that the operation of his car, even at a 
speed of 50 miles per hour, \vas reasonable and prudent. 
It has been repeatedly held that speed alone is not 
sufficient to sho\v willful misconduct under statutes similar 
to ours. In the case of Howard v. Howard, supra, the facts 
reveal that the deceased \Vas riding in an automobile being 
driven by his brother. It was raining or sprinkling and 
the pavement \Vas \\tet. The complaint charged that the 
defendant having full knowledge of the wet street, together 
\vith the fact that there was a curve in the road drove and 
operated his automobile at a high rate of speed, so that the 
same skidded sideways and defendant lost control of it. 
After defining willful misconduct as hereinabove quoted, 
the court held: 
"Applying these rules to the case before us, and con ... 
ceding that this driver must have known that driv ... 
ing on a wet road might possibly result in injury, 
it seems clear that the evidence does not justify the 
belief that he increased his speed with the knowl ... 
edge or belief or expectation that any serious injury 
was probable. He had driven a car for six years 
and this particular car for one year, had driven 
it in the rain without its skidding, and without 
doubt he believed he could do this again. If he may 
be said to have disregarded the possible conse-
quences of his act, such disregard was due to care ... 
lessness rather than to wantonness and reckless ... 
ness, and was undoubtedly based upon his belief 
that no injury was probable. While he may be said 
to have been reckless in the sense of being care ... 
less, that is only negligence and is not within the . 
statute. But the intentional doing of an act with 
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a wanton and reckless disregard of its possible con ... 
sequences implies the doing of such an act either 
with the intent that harm shall result therefrom 
or in the attitude of mind of not caring if it does 
result in injury. No such intent and no such atti..-
tude of mind on the part of this appellant here ap ... 
pears. There is nothing in the evidence to shovJ 
or even indicate that the appellant in driving as he 
did, even though the pavement was wet, either had 
actual. knowledge or in law is chargeable with ac--
tual knowledge that his course of action consti .. 
tuted a real present peril, and that knowing such 
peril existed he consciously and intentionally failed 
to act to avoid the peril and avert an injury. The 
only conclusion possible from reading the evidence 
before us is that while the appellant was in a hurry 
and desired to proceed as rapidly as he could, he 
was not even indifferent to results but, on the con..-
trary, had a fixed desire to arrive at his destina ... 
tion in time to attend a· dance before it closed. It 
clearly appears that, although he proved to be mis-
taken, he thought he could safely drive as he did 
even though the pavement was wet; that while he 
intended to drive rather rapidly he neither in..-
tended the result that happened nor was indiffer..-
ent to the same; and that he was far from being 
in such a frame of mind that he did not care whe..-
ther or not he injured anyone. While this driver 
may have been negligent in a greater or less de..-
gree, in our opinion, no willful misconduct within 
the meaning of this statute is disclosed in this evi..-
. dence." (Italics ours.) 
Again in Driscoll v. Pagano, 314 Mass. 459, 48 N. E. 
( 2d) 1, the evidence revealed that defendant was driving 
an automobile at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour on car 
tracks located in the center of the paved street which was 
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\Vet; that there was a sign reading "slippery when wet," and 
that the guest had noticed the car swaying and wobbling 
and requested the defendant to slow do\vn; that the de ... 
fendant \vas familiar with the road and knew it to be slip ... 
pery in wet weather; and that the car went out of con ... 
trol when the driver attempted to get off the car tracks, 
traveling approximately 150 yards from the point where 
it left the road before coming to rest against a billboard. 
In determining that speed was not sufficient to constitute 
"gross negligence" the court held: 
"The speed at which the defendant was operating, 
in the circumstances disclosed, cannot be said to 
constitute gross negligence. It is true that the road 
was wet, but apart from the evidence that the body 
of the automobile was swaying and that there was 
a 'wobbling,' there is nothing to indicate that up to 
the time the defendant reached the car tracks he 
did not at all times have the automobile under 
control. The same may be said as to the evidence 
of the cautions that were given at about a quarter 
of a mile from the scene of the accident .... We 
refer to several cases in each of which it was held 
that a finding of gross negligence was not war ... 
ranted. McKenna v. Smith, 275 Mass. 149, 175 
N. E. 474 (wet and slippery road, speed forty 
miles an hour, automobile going from side to side 
and twisting and swerving as it went around the 
curves; place particularly dangerous, view ob ... 
structed; caution as to speed). Richards v. Dono ... 
hue, 285 Mass. 19, 188 N. E. 389 (speed fifty 
to fifty ... five miles an hour, passing automobile on 
curve, oil surface; disregard of all requests to mod ... 
erate speed and not to pass another automobile 
on curve; sharp turn to right to avoid oncoming 
automobile, loss of control of automobile which 
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turned around twice and turned over twice). 
Adamian v. Messerlian, 292 Mass. 275, 198 N. E. 
166 (speed forty-five to fifty miles an hour descend ... 
ing particularly slippery and icy hill at night; pro ... 
tests as to speed; automobile began to skid, de ... 
fendant lost control and it continued to skid sev ... 
eral hundred feet). Lynch v. Springfield Safe De ... 
posit & Trust Co., 294 Mass 170,200 N. E. 914 
(speed fifty miles an hour at night). Souza v. Mel ... 
lo, 304 Mass. 552, 24 N. E. 2d 516 (speed sixty 
miles an hour at 6 P. M. in October; collision with 
truck standing on the side of the road) . DeSimone 
v. Pedonti, 308 Mass. 373, 32 N. E. 2d 612 (speed 
about forty ... five miles an hour in the evening, de ... 
fendant urged to slow down or they 'would get 
killed'; defendant angry and cursing; dirt surfaced 
road, 'kind of rough'; automobile skidded when it 
'did not take' a sharp curve)." 
A case, which on the facts is very similar to the one 
here involved, is Elowitz v. Miller, 265 Mich. 551, 251 N. 
W. 548. There the defendant and three others got in de ... 
fendant's automobile and proceeded to go for a ride. One 
of the passengers sat on the lap of another. All three pas-
sengers testified at times the defendant drove at an immod ... 
erate rate of speed, "particularly when turning corners," 
and that one of them asked defendant to return to the 
university campus; that the defendant was told "to slow 
down and watch his driving." In the course of the drive 
the automobile came to a short street known as "Cedar 
Bend Drive." The defendant testified that as they came 
down the drive "he knew they were approaching a curve, 
but reached it sooner than he expected; that as soon as he 
saw it he applied the brakes; and that, had it not been for 
a spot of ic·e or gravel at the corner, his 'guess' was that 
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he \vould haYe made the turn in perfect safety, but that 
'the car sle\ved across the road and launched over the curb 
and hit a tree.' He \vas himself injured in the collision. 
He also testified that his brakes were in 'extremely good 
working order,' and that he had had no trouble in making 
the many other turns vvhile they were driving; that he at 
all times felt that he had his car under control; and that he 
was operating it in a manner that he felt was safe to his 
passengers and himself. His car was practically new, and 
he was doubtless anxious to display his skill as a driver and 
his perfect control over it." 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant moved 
for a judgment which was granted and an appeal was 
taken. The sole question presented was whether the facts 
established willful and wanton misconduct on the part of 
defendant in the operation of his automobile. In affirming 
the judgment of the trial court, it was held: 
"This is in accord with our holding as to liability 
in Finkler v. ·Zimmer, 258 Mich. 336, 241 N. W. 
851. To sustain the claims of the plaintiffs it must 
appear that the defendant had: ' ( 1) Knowledge 
of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary 
care and diligence to avert injury to another; ( 2) 
ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care 
and diligence in the use of means at hand; (3) the 
omission to use such care and diligence to avert 
the threatened danger, when to the ordinary mind 
it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove 
disastrous to another.' Willett v. Smith, 260 Mich. 
101, 104, 244 N. W. 246, 247; MeLone v. Bean, 
263 Mich. 113, 115, 248 N. W. 566. 
"If we eliminate the testimony of the defendant that 
ice or gravel caused his car to skid, of which there 
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is dispute, the proximate cause of the accident was 
the failure of defendant to see the curve at Wall 
Street in time to have slowed down to safely make 
the turn. But, as was said in Van Blaircum v. 
Campbell, 256 Mich. 527, 528, 239 N. W. 865: 
'Perhaps he was not as watchful as he should 
have been. :(. :t- :(. This mere failure or inadvertence 
or lack of care is, at most, ordinary negligence, so 
called.' " 
See, also, Bobich v. Rogers, 258 Mich. 343, 241 N. W. 
854, in which case the evidence revealed that the plain ... 
tiff told the defendant he was driving too fast, and that as 
the car approached a curve plaintiff said "Why don't you 
stop while I get off?" There, the court held: 
"Whether a turn of the road can be made'with rea ... 
sonable safety at any particular speed depends, of 
course, upon the character and condition of the 
road and the skill of the driver. We cannot draw 
a line beyond which mere speed in making a turn 
departs from negligence and becomes willful and 
wanton misconduct. Conceding that defendant 
was negligent in making the turn at high ·speed it 
would not constitute willful and wanton miscon ... 
duct. See Van Blaircum v. Campbell, 256 Mich. 
527,239 N. W. 865." 
"At the most, plaintiff made out a case of negli ... 
gence. To recover he was required to go beyond 
that and establish that he was injured by reason of 
the willful and wanton misconduct of defendant. 
The proofs failed to make such a case. The court 
should have granted a new trial." 
To the same effect are the following: Homes v. Wesler, 
274 Mich. 655, 265 N. W. 492; Riley v. Walters, 277 Mich. 
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620, 270 N. \\1. 160; Katz v. Kvppin. <4 C~al. i\pp. 2d 405, 
112 Pac. (2d) 681; People, .. Thornpson, 41 Cal App. 2d 
Supp. 965, 108 Pac. (2d) 105; Olson \'. 1-fodges, ______ lo\va 
______ , 19 N. W. (2d) 676; Gill v. I-Iayes, 188 Okla. 434, 108 
Pac. (2d) 117; Clark v. Hasselquist, 304 Ill. App. ~-1, 25 
N. E. (2d) 900. 
In Russell v. Turner (Eighth Circuit Court of Ap..-
peals), 148 Fed. (2d) 562, the court deterrnined: 
"It seems apparent that the sixteen year old driver 
of the car drove off the road because ( 1) he was 
driving too fast, (2) he failed to anticipate that 
the road ended where it did end, and (3) he failed 
to observe the end of the road until it \vas too late 
to avoid the accident. An inference that just before 
the accident the car was hurtling through the 
night, out of control, with its protesting passengers 
being tossed about, and \Vith an irritated and ir..-
responsible driver, familiar with the road but who 
did not care what became of himself, his friends, 
or his father's car, behind the \vheel, is an inference 
which, in our opinion, does not accord with a com..-
mon..-sense view of the evidence. The plaintiff is, 
of course, entitled to have the benefit of all favor..-
able inferences which reasonably may be drawn 
from the evidence. She is not entitled to the bene£ t 
of unreasonable inferences. One fairly can believe 
that the evidence in this case does not show m_ore 
than the lack of care, skill and judgment which 
might be expected from an ordinarily imprudent, 
immature, or inexperienced, but nonreckless, dri..-
ver of an automobile. In other \vords, the evidence, 
vie\ved in the aspect most favorable to the plain..-
tiff, is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
the plaintiff's injuries \Vere the result of just ordin..-
ary carelessness on the part of James Turner." 
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"The purpose of the Guest Statute \vas to relieve the 
owner and operator of an automobile from liability 
for negligence resulting in injury to a guest. To 
make a case under the statute, 'It is not sufficient 
to show negligence, but the plaintiff must go fur--
ther than this and show a rash, heedless, disregard 
of danger that would be apparent to or reasonably 
anticipated by a person exercising ordinary pru-
dence and caution under existing circumstances.' 
Wright v. What Cheer Clay Products Co., 221 
Iowa 1292, 1299, 267 N. W. 92, 95. 'It must ap--
pear from the evidence that at the time and place 
of the accident the driver :(. :f. :f. was proceeding 
without heed of or concern for consequences, with 
no care, coupled with a disregard for the safety 
of his guest. :(. :(. :f. An error in judgment, thought--
lessness, or mere inadvertence do not constitute 
recklessness within the meaning of the statute.' 
Tomasek v. Lynch, 233 Iowa 662, 10 N. W. 2d 3, 
7." 
In all of the foregoing cases there was evidence that the 
plaintiff, or some other guest, had protested the manner 
in which the automobile was being operated prior to the 
collision. However, in each case the court determined that 
such protest did not show sufficient knowledge on the part 
of the defendant of the potential danger of the manner in 
which he was operating the vehicle to constitute willful or 
wanton misconduct. As stated by the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts, in the case of Adams v. Doucet, ______ Mass. 
______ ,55 N. E. (2d) 4: 
" . . . the occupants of the automobile apparently 
did not think themselves in grave danger. The 
question before us is one of judgment on the evi--
dence in the particular case. In this case we think 
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that a finding of gross negligence \vas not war ... 
ranted. Romer v. Kaplan, Mass., 54 N. E. (2d) 
673." 
In Katz v. Kuppin, supra, it was further held: 
"The fact that a guest expresses dissatisfaction with 
the manner of the operation of an automobile does 
not ipso facto establish willful misconduct on the 
part of the driver. Plaintiffs' contention that de ... 
fendant became angry on being requested to de ... 
celerate her speed is unimportant. It does not jus ... 
tify the inference that she acted with knowledge 
that under the circumstances it would probably 
lead to injury to her guest and herself." 
Nor does appellant rely entirely upon the proposition 
that plaintiff failed to prove that defendant was guilty of 
willful misconduct. There is evidence in the case that plain ... 
tiff and defendant were acting conjointly in taking the two· 
girls home. (R. 216) That notwithstanding defendant had 
operated the car at excessive speeds on the trip out to 5900 
Holladay Boulevard, plaintiff had voluntarily re .... entered 
the car and proceeded to ride home with the defendant 
without making any cautionary remarks or advising de ... 
fendant to proceed more cautiously; that although de ... 
fendant commenced to accelerate the speed of the auto ... 
mobile after leaving Holladay Intersection (approximately 
one .... third of a mile before reaching the first curve) , plain-
tiff made no comment concerning the operation of the car 
until after defendant had proceeded around the first curve, 
and that at that time there was only sufficient time to make 
the statement to defendant to slow down and state that he 
had been in eight previous accidents when the car pro ... 
ceeded around the second curve and skidded off the hard 
surface. (R. 222, 223) 
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Our Suprerr1e Court has heretofore determined that a 
guest is not -vvithout responsibility while riding in an auto ... 
_mobile. In the case of Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 
77 Utah 21, 290 Pac. 970, the court, in discussing a guest's 
duty, stated: 
"If the guest or in'.!itee knows that the driver is in..-
competent or CJ.i.·eless, or unaware of an approach ... 
ing danger, or is not taking proper precautions to 
avoid it, it again becomes the duty of the guest or 
invitee to caution or notify the operator. So, too, 
if the guest or invitee sees or knows that the oper..-
ator is operating the automobile at an excessive, 
unlawful, or dangerous speed, or in violation of 
traffic rules or regulations, or otherwise is mis-
managing or driving the automobile in a careless 
manner, it again is the duty of the invitee or guest 
to protest and ask the operator to desist; and if the 
guest or invitee fails to do so, he may be regarded 
as having consented to or acquiesced in such viola..-
tions or negligence of the operator, rendering the 
guest or invitee himself personally guilty of negli ... 
gence." 
Again in the case of }Aaybee v. Maybee, 79 Utah 585, 
11 Pac. (2d) 973, the court held: 
"If it was negligence for the defendant to drive at 
this speed -vvith her vision impaired as it was, and 
\Vithout the aid of glasses, it would follow that, 
vvhere all these facts are fully known to and ap--
preciated by the plaintiff, and notwithstanding 
such facts and such knowledge she vvas willing to 
be driven in the c2.r, she not only assumed the risk 
or hazard to her own safety, which resulted from 
such driving, but, bv her acquiescence, -vvas guilty 
of independent negligence which contributed to 
the accident. The plaintiff identified herself -..vith 
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\vhatever negligence there \vas on the part of the 
n1other because of her kno\vledge of all such facts 
and her approval, consent, and acquiescence in 
the driving of the car by her mother.'' 
In Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 Pac. (2d) 224, the 
court stated: 
~'If a guest sees or discovers the danger in time to 
warn the operator of the car or the danger is so 
obvious, or he is in such position that he must have 
seen it in the exercise of due care, and an accident 
happens because of his failure to warn the oper..-
ator of such danger, he may be guilty of negligence 
which will prevent a recovery.'' 
We submit that if there was danger of an accident re-
sulting from the manner in which the defendant operated 
his car north along Holladay ~oulevard approaching the 
first curve, plaintiff should have discovered such danger 
and warned the defendant in sufficient time for defendant 
to reduce the speed of the automobile before negotiating the 
curve. The very fact that no such warning was given, to..-
gether with the evidence that the other guest in the car 
observed no irregularity about the operation of the vehicle, 
is sufficient to establish that there was no willful miscon..-
duct on the part of the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion and by way of summarizing appellant's 
argument, it is respectfully submitted: 
1. That the verdict of the jury should not have been 
set aside by the trial court for the reason that the evidence 
was not sufficient in the first instance to submit to the jury, 
but that as a matter of law, the defendant was entitled to 
a direced verdict. 
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2. That even though the court may determine that the 
case was properly submitted to the jury on the question 
of defendant's willful misconduct, if any, and the plaintiff's 
assumption of risk, if any, the verdict as returned by the 
jury was in accord with- the weight of the evidence, and 
that the trial court should not have granted plaintiff a 
new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN, 
Attorney /or Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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